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Inferiority Complex: Should State
Courts Follow Lower Federal
Court Precedent on the Meaning of
Federal Law?
Amanda Frost*
The conventional wisdom is that state courts need not follow lower
federal court precedent when interpretingfederal law. Upon closer inspection,
however, the question of how state courts should treat lower federal court
precedent is not so clear. Although most state courts now take the conventional
approach, a few contend that they are obligated to follow the lower federal
courts, and two federal courts of appeals have declared that their decisions are
binding on state courts. The Constitution's text and structure send mixed
messages about the relationship between state and lower federal courts, and the
Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the matter. Remarkably, this
significant question about the interplay between the state and federal judicial
systems lingers unresolved more than two-hundred years after the
Constitution'sratification.
This Article uses this question to explore the relationship between state
and lower federal courts. As a constitutional matter, it can be argued that state
courts were intended to play a subordinaterole to the lower federal courts when
interpreting federal law, even if they are viewed as equals when it comes to
finding facts and applying facts to law. Furthermore, Congress's decision to
create the lower federal courts, and then assign them broad federal question
jurisdiction, arguably displaces state court authority to interpret federal law
independently-particularlyin an era in which the Supreme Court lacks the
capacity to resolve many of the splits between the federal and state court
systems. Finally, as a practical matter, allowing state courts to diverge from
lower federal court precedent on matters of federal law can create disruptive
intrastateconflicts that lead to forum shopping and can sometimes take years
to resolve.
*
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comments from Howard Erichson, Abner Greene, Heather Hughes, Amanda Leiter, Jim Pfander,
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Although state courts are unlikely to reverse course and declare that
they are bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts, both Congress and
the Supreme Court arguably have the authority to require that they do so. The
Article concludes by describing the source of these institutions'authority over
state courts, as well as the costs and benefits of requiringstate courts to follow
lower federal court precedent.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Lower federal court precedent cannot bind state courts, or so we
are told. Most state courts assert that they are free to reach their own
conclusions about the meaning of federal law, even when doing so
creates a conflict with the federal court of appeals presiding over the
geographic region in which they sit.' Several federal circuits have

1.
See, e.g., Danner v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 255 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Ark. 2007) ("[Dlecisions
of the federal circuit courts are not binding on this court . . . ."); Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 677
N.W.2d 325, 327 (Mich. 2004) ("Although state courts are bound by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing federal law . . . there is no similar obligation with respect to
decisions of the lower federal courts."). For a detailed discussion of state court treatment of lower
federal court precedent, see infra Part II.
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conceded that their decisions are not binding on state courts, 2 and, in
concurring opinions, two justices have emphatically agreed.3 A number
of federal courts scholars have declared that state courts need not follow
lower federal court precedent because state courts are "coordinate" with
lower federal courts and not "subordinate" to them. 4
And yet, upon closer inspection, the role of lower federal court
precedent in state court decisionmaking remains unclear. A few state
courts appear to believe that they are bound to follow the decisions of
the federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law, and many
others have issued inconsistent opinions on that question.5 The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits claim that state
courts must follow their lead on federal questions, creating a circuit
split that has never been resolved by the Supreme Court.6 Only a
handful of legal scholars have opined on the matter, and most have done

2.
See, e.g., Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause
did not require the Illinois courts to follow Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting the Fifth
Amendment."); see also Bromely v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977) ("[The Oklahoma
Courts may express their differing views on the retroactivity problem or similar federal questions
until we are all guided by a binding decision of the Supreme Court."); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d
804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965) ("Though state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the
Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state . . . they are not obliged to do so.").
3.
See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 n.3 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See infra Part II.C for further
discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on this question.
4.
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law"
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1904 (2011) ("[B]ecause the state supreme courts are
coordinate (not inferior) to the federal courts of appeals on matters of federal law, state courts have
no obligation to harmonize their interpretive choices with the decision of their local federal courts
of appeals."); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of FederalRights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128,
1231 n.495 (1986) (stating that decisions of lower federal courts are no more than persuasive
precedent for state courts); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and FederalDeclaratoryJudgments, 74
Nw. U. L. REV. 759, 771 (1979) (declaring that state courts need not follow lower federal court
precedent because "[lower] federal courts are no more than coordinate with the state courts on
issues of federal law"). But see Kevin Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 31 (2006)
("[T]he question of whether state courts are bound by lower federal courts on the federal law's
content remains open.").
5.
See infra Part II. Of course, state courts never follow federal courts when it comes to the
meaning of state law; rather, federal courts must follow the precedent set by the highest court in
the state on such questions. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This Article
concerns only the precedential force of lower federal court decisions on questions of federal law,
and thus all references in this Article to lower federal court precedent refers to precedent regarding
the meaning of federal law.
6.
Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1991) (assuming that an Arkansas state
trial court would be obligated to follow its precedent on a question of federal constitutional law),
rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Despite the authorities that take the view that state courts are free to ignore decisions of the
lower federal courts on federal questions, we have serious doubts as to the wisdom of this view.").
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so in passing in articles devoted to other subjects.' Remarkably, then,
this significant question about the interplay between the state and
federal judicial systems lingers unresolved more than two-hundred
years after the Constitution's ratification.8
The relationship between the lower federal courts and the state
courts raises foundational questions about the place of those federal
courts in our constitutional structure. Are the lower federal courts'
interpretations of federal law binding on the states under the
Supremacy Clause, as the Supreme Court considers its own precedent
to be?9 Alternatively, are state and lower federal courts coequals under
the Constitution such that neither can control the other's rulings? Does
Congress or the Supreme Court have the constitutional authority to
require that state courts follow lower federal court precedent? If not, is
it because principles of federalism forbid such interference with state
institutions, or because such a rule undermines judicial independence,
or both? 0
Similar foundational questions were raised seventy-five years
ago in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," when the Supreme Court overruled
Swift v. Tyson1 2 and held that federal courts must follow state law as
articulated by a state's highest court. The Court explained that federal
courts undermined state sovereignty by failing to treat state courts'

7.
See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State
Judges Should Use to Ascertain FederalLaw, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1444 (1999) ("Scholarly
treatment of [the weight of lower federal court precedent in state court] is . . . brief and
conclusory."). Zeigler's article is the only article in the last fifty years to address the question in
any detail, and his article does not engage in a sustained analysis of the constitutional questions
at the heart of this Article. For further discussion of Zeigler's article, see infra Part II.D.
8.
See Annotation, Duty of State Courts to Follow Decisions of Federal Courts, Other than
the Supreme Court, on Federal Questions, 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943):
If the United States Supreme Court has not passed upon a Federal question but there
are decisions of one or more of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals or of the
United States District Courts, is a state court bound to follow them? On this there is a
conflict of authority.
9.
According to the Supreme Court, the Supremacy Clause requires that state courts follow
its interpretation of federal law. See Danforth v. Missouri, 552 U.S. 264, 308 (2008); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1954). A number of scholars have questioned that conclusion, however.
See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387, 403-04 (summarizing the critiques of Cooper v. Aaron).
10. A leading federal courts casebook asks whether it would be "constitutional for Congress
to require a state court to treat as controlling precedent the decisions of the federal circuit court of
appeals within whose boundaries the state sits?" The authors do not answer that question.
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 446 (6th ed. 2009).
11. 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
12. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
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views on state law as controlling. 13 Although Erie focused on the federal
courts' obligation to adopt state common law, the decision confirmed
that federal courts must follow state courts' interpretations of state
positive law as well. 14 The bottom line after Erie is that state courts
have the final word on the meaning of state law.
Erie is one of a handful of iconic cases that has shaped our
understanding of not only the relationship between state and federal
courts but also our entire federal system. According to John Hart Ely,
Erie "implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our
federalism."15 And yet Erie left the job half done. The case tells us how
federal courts should treat state courts' precedent on state law, but it
does not address how state courts should respond to federal courts'
interpretation of federal law. Of course, some might argue that Erie
supports the conclusion that state courts are bound only by the
Supreme Court on questions of federal law, just as federal courts are
required to follow only the precedent of the highest court of the state on
questions of state law. And yet the unique and limited role of the
Supreme Court creates a significant disjunction: the Court cannot
quickly resolve disputes between state and federal courts on the
meaning of federal law, leaving intrastate splits to linger between these
court systems for decades. 16
A few recent examples of some significant state-lower federal
court splits illustrate the point:

13.
304 U.S. at 78 ("[W]hether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.").
14. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson's assertion that federal courts are not required to follow
state common law but affirmed Swift's view that federal courts must follow "the positive statutes
of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by local tribunals." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
15. John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974).
16.
See, e.g., JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT 90 (2009) ("[Sltate courts now exercise
final authority in virtually every federal question case that comes before them."); Anthony J. Bellia
Jr., State Courts and the Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1505-06 (2006)
("In reality, state court judgments resting upon the interpretation of federal statutes may-indeed,
in the overwhelming majority of cases today, do-govern the rights and duties of parties subject
to them without Supreme Court review."); Henry J. Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All
That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 406, 412 (1972):
[T]he Supreme Court's inability to hear more than a relatively few cases each term, its
desire sometimes to let the dust settle before moving in, and other factors permit each
circuit to make its own federal law in limited areas at least for a short time and
occasionally . . . for a long one.

Gluck, supranote 4, at 1966 (noting that the Supreme Court rarely reviews state court decisions,
thus concluding that it is "unrealistic" to rely on the Supreme Court to compel uniform
interpretation of federal law); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) ("[I]n our current judiciary, the Court can review only a fraction of the
lower federal and state court cases raising federal questions.").
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*

Virginia
state
courts
have
repeatedly
upheld
the
constitutionality of a Virginia statute criminalizing sodomy as
applied to cases involving minors, distinguishing the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas holding a Texas
antisodomy statute unconstitutional in a case involving sodomy
between consenting adults. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has
declared that Lawrence requires invalidating the Virginia
antisodomy statute in all its applications and has thus granted
habeas relief to defendants convicted in Virginia state courts.17

*

California state courts have held that provisions of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code governing the avoidance of preferential
transfers do not preempt the provisions of the California Code of
Civil Procedure that allow assignment to avoid certain
preferential transfers. Those decisions are in direct conflict with
the Ninth Circuit's decision holding that the California law is
preempted by federal law.18

*

The Fourth Circuit has held that the stream of commerce of
goods into a state, taken alone, is not sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer of those goods, 19 a
position that is at odds with the high courts of South Carolina
and West Virginia, both of which are located within that
circuit. 20 Thus, manufacturers are potentially subject to suit in

state court but not in federal court for harm caused by products
that find their way into those states.
*

In 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Fifth
Amendment requires only that law enforcement inform a

17.
See Saunders v. Commonwealth, 753 S.E.2d 602, 607-08 (Va. Ct. App. 2014) (following
the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion in McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918 (Va.
2007), that the law is constitutional and rejecting the Fourth Circuit's contrary decision in
MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013)). See infra Part IV.A.1 for a discussion of the
provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 barring habeas relief for
state court decisions that conflict only with lower federal court decisions, and not decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court.
18.
See Credit Managers Ass'n of Cal. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d
259, 264 (Ct. App. 2006) (describing split between Haberbush v. Charles & Dorothy Cummins
Family Ltd., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814 (Ct. App. 2006), and Sherwood Partnersv. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d
1198 (9th Cir. 2005)).
19. Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1994).
20. State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading, Co., 666 S.E.2d 218, 222-23 (S.C. 2008); West
Virginia ex rel. CSR, Ltd. v. MacQueen, 441 S.E.2d 658, 660-61 (W. Va. 1994). The Supreme Court
failed to resolve this question in its recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011).

60

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1:53

suspect that he has a right to counsel prior to interrogation,
without specifying that counsel may be present during the
interrogation. That decision is in direct conflict with the 1968
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
holding that a suspect must be informed that he has a right to
counsel before and during interrogation.2 1 Accordingly, the
standard for Mirandizing a suspect in the state of Texas varies
depending on whether the case would be tried in state or federal
court."
As these examples show, the interaction between lower federal
courts and state courts is worth examining for both academic and
practical reasons. As a matter of constitutional theory, we should have
a better handle on the relationship between the two systems. As a
practical matter, we should resolve ongoing confusion about the role of
lower federal court precedent in state courts. Although commentators
have endlessly analyzed the costs and benefits of federalism generally,
less attention has been paid to the Constitution's most creative
harnessing of federal and state institutions: the interdependent
structures of the federal and state court systems. 23 A deeper
understanding of the ways in which state and federal courts can, do,
and should interact is long overdue. Articulating the rationales
underlying state court treatment of lower federal court precedent will
help to illuminate that relationship.
Furthermore, if, as most assume, state courts are not
constitutionally obligated to follow precedent set by the lower federal
courts, then we should determine whether it is constitutionally
permissible for Congress or the Supreme Court to require them to do
so. Arguably, legislation seeking to control the weight of lower federal

21. Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Bridgers v. Dretke,
431 F.3d 853, 858-59 (5th Cir. 2005) (describing the split).
22.
In Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010), the Supreme Court held that police officers
satisfied Miranda when they told a suspect that he had a right to talk to a lawyer before answering
questions, and that he could exercise any of his rights at any time during the interview, because
the officers made sufficiently clear that the suspect had a right to counsel during questioning. The
Court did not address whether Miranda would be satisfied were an officer to state only that counsel
would be made available before questioning. Thus, the division between the Fifth Circuit and the
Texas state courts has yet to be fully resolved.
23.
Of course there are important exceptions. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Barry
Friedman, Under the Law of FederalJurisdiction:Allocating Cases Between the State and Federal
Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211 (2004). Furthermore, a number of recent articles have addressed
the related question of how state courts should employ rules of statutory interpretation when
interpreting federal statutes. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 4, at 30-32; Gluck, supra note 4, at
1904.
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court precedent in state court is justified under Congress's power to
enact all laws necessary and proper to effectuate the work of the lower
federal courts--courts that Congress created under its authority to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."2 4 Likewise, the
Supreme Court's authority to fashion common-law rules of procedure to
safeguard the uniformity and supremacy of federal law could justify a
rule mandating that state courts follow lower federal court precedent.
On the other hand, any attempt by Congress or the Supreme Court to
tell states how to treat federal court precedent raises thorny questions
about the scope of state sovereignty and the need to preserve judicial
independence. These questions are worthy of further examination.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II begins by canvassing
state courts' varied treatment of lower federal court precedent and then
briefly describes the views of the federal courts of appeals, the Supreme
Court, and academic commentators on the question.
Part III analyzes the competing arguments from the
Constitution's text and structure regarding the force of lower federal
court precedent in state court. Article III of the Constitution permits
the federal and state systems to exist side by side, exercising concurrent
jurisdiction over cases involving both state and federal law, but does not
explain how these separate court systems are to treat each other's
decisions. Although the Constitution does not clearly address the issue,
it is possible to draw inferences about the intended relationship
between the state courts and the lower federal courts from the
Madisonian Compromise, the original understanding, and these courts'
respective institutional competencies. Although the evidence from these
sources is mixed, sound arguments can be made that state courts were
not intended to stand entirely apart from the lower federal courts when
it comes to interpreting federal law. Furthermore, Congress's decision
to create the lower federal courts and then vest them with broad federal
question jurisdiction should also play a role in our understanding of the
evolving relationship between these two court systems. In short, the
constitutional arguments in favor of the conventional view that state
courts are assumed to operate independently of the lower federal courts
are surprisingly weak.
Admittedly, however, the Constitution does not speak clearly
about the relationship between the state and lower federal courts. Thus,
the more important question is whether Congress could enact a law
requiring state courts to follow lower federal court precedent on
questions of federal law or whether the Supreme Court could establish
a common-law rule to the same effect. Part IV addresses this question.
24.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8.

62

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1:53

Part V then outlines the costs and benefits of a rule requiring
state court adherence to lower federal court precedent and concludes
that, under some circumstances, it would be wise to tie a state court's
hands by mandating that it follow the precedent of the federal court of
appeals for the geographic region in which that state is located.
II. STATE COURT TREATMENT OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT PRECEDENT
A. The State Courts
State courts vary in the weight they give to lower federal court
precedent on questions of federal law, ranging from "slavishly follow" to
"totally disregard." 25 State courts rarely explain the rationale for their
views regarding lower federal court precedent, and many have issued
inconsistent opinions on the question. 26 That said, it is possible to
(loosely) categorize states into three basic camps: those that consider
opinions by lower federal courts to be persuasive precedent, those that
give those decisions no weight, and those that consider them binding.27
The majority of state courts consider decisions by the inferior
federal courts to be persuasive authority. For example, the Alabama
Supreme Court declared, "While decisions of the federal circuit courts
are not binding on this court, we find the First Circuit's interpretation
of the [Federal Arbitration Act] to be highly persuasive." 28 Likewise, the
Connecticut Supreme Court wrote that "decisions of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, although often persuasive, are not binding on this
court." 2 9 These state courts will typically follow the lead of those federal
circuits that have opined on a federal question unless they strongly
disagree with the position taken by those courts, or the lower federal
courts themselves are in disagreement.

25.
Zeigler, supra note 7, at 1153.
26.
For example, compare Martin v. Cullum, 299 P.2d 29, 30 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1956) ("This court cannot indulge in the luxury of its own ideas where a federal statute is
concerned, but is bound by the decisions of the federal courts, and particularly, by the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court."), with People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 736 (Cal. 1997)
("Decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts.").
27. As employed here, the terms "precedent" and "binding precedent" refer to the holding in
a judicial decision that must be followed in subsequent cases raising the same issue. In contrast,
"persuasive precedent" carries special weight, but a court may disregard it if it concludes the
earlier decision is incorrect.
28. See, e.g., Danner v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 255 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Ark. 2007) ("While
decisions of the federal circuit courts are not binding on this court, we find the First Circuit's
interpretation of the FAA to be highly persuasive.").
29. Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 952 A.2d 1, 17 n.24 (Conn. 2008); see also Coral Constr.,
Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 235 P.3d 947, 958 (Cal. 2010) ("While the lower federal courts' decisions
do not bind us, we give them 'great weight' when they reflect a consensus, as they do here.").
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A few state courts appear to give federal appellate precedent
very little weight when making their own determinations about the
meaning of federal law. The Maryland Court of Appeals stated,
"Although we certainly consider federal court decisions when
interpreting the United States Constitution, it is our interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, confined by Supreme Court precedent, that is
relevant . . . ."3 The Indiana Supreme Court explained that if its
decisions are in accord with the Seventh Circuit, it is only because it is
in "substantive agreement on the merits" rather than because it owes
"perfunctory deference to the Seventh Circuit." 31 The Louisiana
Supreme Court declared that it is "not bound by the decisions of the
lower federal courts," though it will review them for "guidance." 32
Finally, at least a few state supreme courts appear to consider
themselves bound by lower federal court decisions on questions of
federal law, although that number has shrunk in recent years. In King
v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc., the Mississippi Supreme Court
stated that the "Court's task in the present case is simplified greatly by
the fact that there is a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision on point,
which this Court considers to be controlling with regard to the present
issue of federal law."33 The Arkansas Supreme Court explained that it
is "bound by the decisions of the Federal Courts" in construing federal
law, and then referred to and cited decisions of the federal district
courts and the Sixth Circuit in making its decision. 34 The high courts in
Delaware,3 5 New Hampshire, 36 and South Carolina 37 have similarly
suggested that lower federal court precedent is controlling when
addressing federal questions.3 8 However, it is not clear whether these

30. Agurs v. State, 998 A.2d 868, 884 n.13 (Md. 2010).
Indiana Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Payne, 622 N.E.2d 461, 468 (Ind. 1993).
31.
32. FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Weaver, 62 So.3d 709, 714 (La. 2011).
33.
697 So.2d 439, 440 (Miss. 1997).
34. Malvern Gravel Co. v. Mitchell, 385 S.W.2d 144, 147-48 (Ark. 1964).
35.
Atlas Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Portscheller, 46 A.2d 643, 646-50 (Del. 1945) ("[Q]uestions
relating to due process of law under the Federal Constitution should be resolved in accordance
with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and other federal courts, rather than
with the decisions of state courts . . . .").
36.
Desmarais v. Joy Mfg. Co., 538 A.2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1988) ("[In exercising our
jurisdiction with respect to what is essentially a federal question, we are guided and bound by
federal statutes and decisions of the federal courts interpreting those statutes.").
37.
Massey v. War Emergency Co-Operative Ass'n, 39 S.E.2d 907, 912 (S.C. 1946) ("[W]e are
bound by the decisions of the Federal Courts, if any, in construing the Federal statute and the
rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated pursuant to that statute.").
38.
In addition, California and Alabama state courts have suggested that they are bound by
interpretations of the inferior federal courts when those decisions are "numerous and consistent."
Etcheverry v. TRI-AG Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366, 368 (Cal. 2000); Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165,
168 (Ala. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001).
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courts voluntarily take this position or whether they believe that they
are constitutionally compelled to do so. And far fewer state courts
declare that they are compelled to follow lower federal court precedent
today than in the past.3 9
Although most states can be grouped into one of these three
camps, it is not unusual to find state courts issuing inconsistent
opinions on the question or for state lower courts take a different
position from that same state's high court-each court apparently
unaware of the other's conflicting views. In short, the state courts
themselves appear to be confused about the weight to give lower federal
court precedent on questions of federal law.
B. The Federal Courts of Appeals
In 1991, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits declared that state
courts are bound by federal courts of appeals' decisions regarding the
meaning of federal law. In Yniguez v. Arizona,40 the Ninth Circuit wrote
that it had "serious doubts" whether state courts were free to disregard
the precedent set by the lower federal courts. It reasoned that, by
choosing to create the lower federal courts, "Congress may have
intended that . .. federal courts . .. have the final word on questions of
federal law," and noted that the "contrary view could lead to
considerable friction between state and federal courts as well as
duplicative litigation." 4 1 Likewise, in Fretwell v. Lockhart, the Eighth
Circuit observed that "state courts are bound by the Supremacy Clause
to obey federal constitutional law," which in turn meant that "a
reasonable state trial court" should follow Eighth Circuit precedent on
constitutional questions. 42
Several other federal courts of appeals assume that state courts
are not bound by the lower federal courts, however. The Fourth Circuit
declared that "[t]hough state courts may for policy reasons follow the
decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state, they
are not obliged to do so."43 And the Tenth Circuit agreed that "[state

39. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 825 n.32 (1994) (concluding that state courts need not follow lower federal court
precedent, but acknowledging that the "doctrinal rule lay somewhat unsettled until recently, as
various state courts suggested that in certain circumstances they were bound to follow local federal
court decisions").
40.
939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991).
41. Id.
42.
946 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
43.
Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965) (internal citations omitted).
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courts] may express their differing views on. . . federal questions until
we are all guided by a binding decision of the Supreme Court."44
C. The Supreme Court
Although a majority of the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed the weight state courts should give lower federal court
precedent, two Justices have stated in concurrences that state courts
are not constitutionally obligated to follow inferior federal courts, and a
recent majority opinion contains dicta suggesting that state courts are
not bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts.
In Lockhart v. Fretwell,45 Justice Thomas wrote separately to
explain that state courts are under no constitutional obligation to follow
lower federal court precedent. The case came to the Supreme Court
from the Eighth Circuit, which had reversed a defendant's death
sentence after concluding that the defendant had been prejudiced by his
lawyer's failure to object to the use of a sentencing factor barred by a
previous Eighth Circuit decision. The Eighth Circuit explained that
''since state courts are bound by the Supremacy Clause to obey federal
constitutional law, we conclude that a reasonable state trial court would
have sustained an objection based on [the Eighth Circuit's precedent]
had [the defendant's] attorney made one."4 6 The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the lawyer's failure to object was not prejudicial
because it did not deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural
right to which he was entitled. 47
Justice Thomas wrote separately to "call attention to what can
only be described as a fundamental misunderstanding of the
Supremacy Clause on the part of the Court of Appeals." 48 Thomas went
on to explain:
Mhe Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal
supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's
interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's interpretation. In our

44. Bromely v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977).
506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
45.
46. Fretwell, 946 F.2d at 577.
47. Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 364.
48. Id. at 375 (Thomas, J., concurring). No other Justice joined the concurrence. However,
an oddly cryptic footnote in the Court's unanimous opinion in Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona stated that the Ninth Circuit's view that state courts within the Ninth Circuit must follow
its precedent was "remarkable," citing Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lockhart. 520 U.S. 43, 58
n.11 (1997).
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federal system, a state trial court's interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative
than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located.49

Then-Justice Rehnquist also mentioned the issue in a footnote
in a concurring opinion in Steffel v. Thompson, decided nineteen years
earlier. 0 Rehnquist explained that a federal appellate decision "would
not be accorded the stare decisis effect in state court that it would have
in a subsequent proceeding within the same federal jurisdiction." He
was the only justice to address that question.5 1
Finally, in 2013, a majority of the Court appeared to agree with
Justice Thomas and Justice Rehnquist, declaring in Johnson v.
Williams that the "views of the federal courts of appeals do not bind the
California Supreme Court when it decides a federal constitutional
question." 52 But that statement falls short of a definitive resolution of
the issue for at least two reasons.
First, Johnson discussed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996's ("AEDPA") deferential standard of review, which
permits a federal court to grant habeas relief on an issue adjudicated
on the merits in state court only if the state court decision "was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States."53 As will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, Congress has
considerable authority to alter precedential rules. In enacting the
provision quoted above, Congress explicitly sought to free state courts
of any obligation to obey lower federal court precedent by prohibiting
federal courts from granting habeas relief when state courts deviated
from lower federal court precedent. Thus, the Court's comment in the
context of AEDPA litigation does not clearly address the question of
whether state courts are free to ignore all lower federal court precedent
in circumstances in which there is no statute addressing that question.
Second, the case itself did not turn on whether state courts must
follow lower federal court precedent, rendering the Court's statement
dicta. The issue in Johnson was whether the state court had
"adjudicated on the merits" the habeas petitioner's federal
49.
Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring). By inserting parentheses around the
word "lower," Justice Thomas may have been suggesting that state courts need not follow even the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law-a far more radical position that is at odds
with almost all federal and state case law but that has nonetheless been promoted by a few
academic commentators. See Farber, supra note 9 (discussing scholarly disagreement over the
precedential force of U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
50.
415 U.S. 452, 482 n.3 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
51.
Id.; see also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that lower federal court precedent has "persuasive force" in state court).
52.
133 S. Ct. 1088, 1098 (2013).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
53.
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constitutional claim; if it did, AEDPA's deferential standard applied.54
The Ninth Circuit held that the state court had not "adjudicated" the
federal constitutional question but instead had addressed only a related
state law question. As evidence for this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the state court had not cited to any of the lower federal court
precedent addressing the federal issue in its opinion.5 5 The Ninth
Circuit did not declare that the state court was bound to follow lower
federal court precedent, and none of the parties raised that issue in
their briefs. Thus, the question before both the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court was whether the state court addressed the federal issue
in its opinion and not whether it was required to follow lower federal
court precedent when it did so.
In any case, the Court cited nothing to support the statement,
nor did it explain why lower federal court decisions have no binding
effect on state courts. Thus, whatever the Court's views on this
question, it has never provided a rationale that would help to clarify the
relationship between state and federal courts.
D. The Academic Literature
Although academic commentary is sparse, the nearly
unanimous conclusion is that lower federal court precedent is not
binding on state courts. In 1979, Professor David Shapiro stated that
state courts are free to disregard constitutional decisions by the federal
courts of appeals. "Only rulings of the Supreme Court are thought
eligible for that distinction," Shapiro declared, "since only the Supreme
Court sits atop the state courts in the national hierarchy. Other federal
courts are no more than coordinate with the state courts on issues of
federal law."5 6 Shapiro admitted, however, that the "appealing purity"
of this model is "somewhat muddied" by habeas corpus, which gives the
lower federal courts quasi-appellate power over some state court
criminal cases.5 7 He concluded, however, that even in habeas cases,
state courts may choose whether to follow federal precedent, leaving it
to the Supreme Court to resolve any conflict.5 8
In the thirty-plus years since Shapiro opined on the matter, only
a handful of other scholars have addressed the issue, and then only

54.
133 S. Ct. at 1091-92.
55. Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 639 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Johnson v.
Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013).
56. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 771.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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briefly in articles devoted to other subjects.5 9 For example, Professor
Richard Fallon agreed that "state courts and lower federal courts stand
in a coordinate, rather than a hierarchical, relationship" and thus
decisions of lower federal courts do not bind the states.6 0 Professor
Daniel Meltzer likewise wrote that "[d]ecisions of lower federal courts
on issues of federal law are not binding precedents for a state court." In
contrast, Professor Kevin Clermont has noted that "the question of
whether state courts are bound by lower federal courts on the federal
law's content remains open." 6 None of these scholars engaged in a
detailed discussion of that question, however.
Donald Zeigler's 1999 article in the William & Mary Law Review
provides the only sustained examination of the role of lower federal
court precedent in state court. Zeigler provides a thoughtful analysis of
the costs and benefits of different approaches by state courts to lower
federal precedent and concludes that "state courts should decide
questions of federal law the way they think the Supreme Court would
decide them" without necessarily giving significant weight to lower
federal court decisions. 62 Zeigler flags, but does not address at any
length, the questions at the heart of this Article about the
constitutionally prescribed relationship between the states and the
lower federal courtS 63 and the question of whether Congress or the
Supreme Court could control state court treatment of lower federal
court precedent. 64

59.
See Caminker, supra note 39, at 825 ("[A] state court need not follow the holdings of any
inferior federal court, including the court of appeals in whose geographic region the state court

sits."); Clermont, supra note 4, at 31 ("[T]he question of whether state courts are bound by lower
federal courts on the federal law's content remains open."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense
of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 853-854 (1991) ("Because state courts and lower federal courts
stand in a coordinate, rather than a hierarchical, relationship, the binding effect of the federal
judgment extends no further than the parties to the lawsuit."); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 510 (1954) ("The suggestion seems never
to have been seriously made that the courts of the states are formally bound by the decisions of
federal district courts or even of federal courts of appeal on questions of federal law."); Richard A.
Matasar, Rediscovering "One ConstitutionalCase": ProceduralRules and the Rejection of the Gibbs
Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction,71 CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1422 n.94 (1983) ("[T]he state and lower
courts are bound to follow their own view of what the federal law means, in spite of conflicting
decisions by other lower courts."); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeituresof FederalRights, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1231 n.495 (1986) (stating that decisions of lower federal courts are no more
than persuasive precedent for state courts).
60. Fallon, supra note 59, at 853-54.
61. Clermont, supranote 4, at 31.
62. Zeigler, supranote 7, at 1145.
63. Id. at 1177-79.
64.

Id. at 1145 n.7.
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E. Conclusion
The most compelling reason to take a closer look at the weight
that state courts should give lower federal court precedent is that at
least some state courts have issued confused and inconsistent opinions
on that question. The great majority of state courts seem to believe that
they must give lower federal courts' decisions on questions of federal
law some deference-though they do not make clear whether that is a
policy choice that they are free to abandon or an external restraint on
their decisionmaking. Finally, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits both
concluded that at least those state courts within their jurisdiction are
obligated to follow their pronouncements on federal law, putting them
at odds with the academic and judicial mainstream as well. If nothing
else, this ongoing confusion about the role of lower federal court
precedent in state court should be addressed and resolved.
In addition, the question deserves attention because no
compelling justification has been advanced to support the mainstream
view. If state courts are free to depart from the precedent set by lower
federal courts in their region, thereby creating inconsistent legal
standards that confound local populations and require Supreme Court
resolution, we should be able to explain why that is so. And yet, as
discussed below, the reasons are far from obvious. Neither the text nor
the structure of the Constitution provides a clear answer to this
question, which renders the academic consensus particularly odd.
Moreover, it may be possible to change the status quo. As described in
Part V, strong arguments can be made in support of congressional
authority to require state courts to follow lower federal court precedent
or to allow the Supreme Court to fashion such a rule as a matter of
federal common law.
III. THE STATE COURTS, THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHY

Does the Constitution guarantee state courts' independence
from lower federal court precedent, as several scholars have concluded?
Alternatively, is it plausible to read the Constitution to require state
courts to follow lower federal court precedent on questions of federal
law-meaning that the majority of state courts have got it all wrong?
Or does the Constitution take a middle ground, permitting Congress or
the Supreme Court to impose such a rule but not otherwise requiring
state court fidelity to lower federal courts? Perhaps the Constitution is
silent on the matter, leaving it to future generations to define their
relationship. Answering these questions requires examining the
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constitutional relationship between the state courts and lower federal
courts.
A number of courts and commentators have declared that state
courts are equal, not inferior, to the lower federal courts, which is why
they are under no obligation to follow, or even defer to, lower federal
court precedent.6 5 However, as discussed in Section A below, evidence
from the Constitution's text and structure, as well as the expansion of
the size and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts over the past two
hundred years, arguably supports the conclusion that the lower federal
courts are superior to state courts when interpretingfederal law, even
if they are not when finding facts, applying facts to law, or hearing state
law claims. In other words, although the Constitution assumes that
state courts are competent to hear disputes over the meaning of federal
law, it does not necessarily treat them as equal to the lower federal
courts when doing so.
Even if state and lower federal courts are coequals when it comes
to interpreting federal law, Section B asks whether that coequal status
automatically provides state courts with complete independence from
lower federal court precedent. As explained in more detail below, the
power to bind does not require superiority-that is, it does not depend
on whether one court is "above" another in the constitutional
hierarchy-rather, it may turn on the relative institutional competence
of the decisionmaker or even simple administrability.
A.

State and Lower Federal Courts in the ConstitutionalHierarchy
1. Origins of the Problem: The Madisonian Compromise

The Framers were conflicted about how to distribute judicial
power between the state and federal courts, which may explain why the
relationship between these institutions remains hazy today. One group,
including James Madison, argued in favor of a national federal judiciary
to hear Article III cases in the first instance, in part out of fear that
state courts would subvert federal interests. 6 6 The opposing camp, led
by John Rutledge of South Carolina, worried that a multiplicity of
federal courts would undermine state sovereignty and diminish the
65. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 59, at 853-54; Gluck, supra note 4, at 1960; Shapiro, supra
note 4, at 771; see also Iowa Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 232 N.W. 445, 454 (Iowa 1930) (stating that
state and lower federal courts are "as to the laws of the United States, co-ordinate courts"), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Iowa-Des Moines Natl'1 Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
66.

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.

1937). James Madison strongly advocated for the creation of the lower federal courts, arguing that
Supreme Court review would be unable to rectify decisions reached "under the biased directions
of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury." Id.
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stature of the state judiciary, and so preferred a single Supreme Court
that would hear appeals from the state courts.6 7
The conflict was resolved after Madison brokered a compromise
that allowed, but did not require, Congress to create "inferior" federal
courts. The "Madisonian Compromise" can be found in the first sentence
of Article III, which vests the federal judicial power in "one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." Complementing this language, Article I
empowers Congress to create "Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court."6 8 Significantly, Congress immediately took up the invitation in

the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the lower federal courts have existed in
varying forms ever since. At least in theory, however, Congress could
abolish these courts at any time. 69
The Madisonian Compromise shaped the development of the
federal judiciary, perhaps in more ways than the Framers intended.
Both Congress and the courts have assumed that Congress's greater
power to forgo creation of the lower federal courts implies that Congress
has the lesser power to control their jurisdiction, size, and structure.7 0
Although Congress's discretion is not unbounded-for example, there
are external constitutional constraints on its power to strip the lower
federal courts of jurisdiction-the Madisonian Compromise gives
Congress broad authority over these courts.
Most relevant to the subject of this Article, the Madisonian
Compromise also informs our understanding of the role of the state
courts in the constitutional structure. State courts are presumptively
competent to hear and decide federal claims.7 1 Indeed, because the

67. Id. At the Constitutional Convention, John Rutledge, Chair of the Committee of Detail,
questioned whether the Constitution should establish the lower federal courts, arguing:
[T]he State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first
instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal'being sufficient to secure
the national rights & uniformity of Judgments: that it was making an unnecessary
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States, and creating unnecessary obstacles to
their adoption of the new system.
Id. Pierce Butler feared that the "States will revolt at such encroachments." Id. at 125.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. For a detailed discussion of the debates leading up to the
Madisonian Compromise, see PFANDER, supranote 16, at 54.
69. See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803) (holding that Congress has the
constitutional authority to abolish federal judgeships).
70. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) ("Congress, having the power to
establish the [lower federal] courts, must define their respective jurisdictions."); Stuart, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 299.
71. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("[W]e have consistently held that state courts
have inherent authority, and thus are presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising
under the laws of the United States."); Sheldon, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 449; see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (concluding that state courts presumptively exercise concurrent

72

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1:53

lower federal courts exist at Congress's discretion, and because the
Supreme Court has limited original jurisdiction, state courts must be
available to hear cases falling within Article III's subject matter
headings to ensure a forum for these cases. 72 Applying this logic, the
Supreme Court has explained that state courts are obligated to hear
cases raising federal claims 73 and must employ certain federal
procedural rules that are bound up with federal claims of right.74
Today, lower federal courts and state courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over most cases arising under federal law. Although the
scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction has varied over the years,
state courts have always had presumptive jurisdiction over cases that
can be brought as an original matter in federal district court unless
Congress explicitly states otherwise. As Alexander Hamilton explained
in Federalist No. 82, the "inference seems to be conclusive, that the
State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising
under the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited."7
In sum, the Framers established a system in which lower federal
courts and state courts share jurisdiction over cases about the meaning
of federal law. Decisions by both institutions can be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, and both sets of courts consider themselves obligated
to follow Supreme Court precedent about the meaning of federal law.76
The open question is whether state courts are under any
constitutional obligation to defer to lower federal courts' views on the
interpretation of federal law. The Madisonian Compromise does not
answer that question. In fact, it cuts both ways. The Madisonian
Compromise presumes that state courts are competent to decide
jurisdiction over cases falling within federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction except where
Congress expressly states otherwise).
72.
See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-91 (1947) (holding that state courts must hear
and enforce claims brought under federal law)); see also Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench,
Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311 n.3 (1976)
("[T]he framers assumed that if Congress chose not to create lower federal courts, the state courts
could serve as trial forums in federal cases.").
73.
Testa, 330 U.S. at 391. States may refuse to hear a federal claim when they have a "valid
excuse" to do so, however. Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88
(1929); see also Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740 (2009) (holding that a state court could not
refuse to hear a certain subset of claims under a particular federal statute once it had established
courts of general jurisdiction competent to hear claims under that statute).
See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (holding
74.
that the right to a trial by jury is "too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the [Federal
Employers' Liability] Act to permit it to be classified as a mere 'local rule of procedure' " that can
be denied to a plaintiff bringing a claim under that Act).
75.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
76. Although almost everyone agrees that both state and federal courts must follow Supreme
Court precedent on the meaning of federal law, scholars differ as to why that is so. See supra notes
8-10 and accompanying text.
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questions of federal law, but it also gives Congress the option to create
lower federal courts, at least in part because some of the Framers feared
that the state courts would be hostile to federal claims.77 In other words,
the Framers were optimistic about the ability of state courts to decide
cases falling within Article III's subject-matter jurisdiction headings
and yet hedged their bets by allowing Congress to create the safety net
of the lower federal court system to protect litigants in the event that
state courts are not up to the task. As a result of this schizophrenia, the
Madisonian Compromise provides no clear answer to the question of
whether lower federal court precedent should bind state courts.78
2. The Evolving Role of the Lower Federal Courts
The Framer's ambivalence toward the state courts, as expressed
in the Madisonian Compromise, suggests that the relationship between
the state courts and the lower federal courts was expected to change
over time. And it has. For even if state courts were considered equally
competent interpreters of federal law at the time of the Framing, they
have arguably been demoted by subsequent events.
a. The Expansion of the Lower FederalCourts
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress immediately took up the
Madisonian Compromise's invitation to create lower federal courts. But
it did not give these courts general federal question jurisdiction until
1875,79 and it staffed them lightly. Over the years, it has expanded the
number and size of those courts, as well as their jurisdiction. Today,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, if either the plaintiff or the defendant prefers
a federal forum for a case in which a federal question arises on the face
of a well-pleaded complaint, a federal court must hear the case.
Arguably, then, state courts have lost status as interpreters of federal
law in light of Congress's decision to create a permanent cadre of federal
judges who are capable of taking the lead on these questions. As the
Ninth Circuit put it: "Having chosen to create the lower federal courts,
Congress may have intended that just as state courts have the final

77. See supra note 68.
78. As Michael Wells put it, there is a "broad consensus" that state courts are
"constitutionally adequate" fora for federal claims, and yet at the same time are not federal courts'
equals when doing so. Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609, 615 (1991).
79. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2012)).
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word on questions of state law, the federal courts ought to have the final
word on questions of federal law." 80

Federal preemption provides a good analogy. Under preemption
doctrine, in most cases state law is valid and binding unless and until
Congress enacts a conflicting federal law, after which the Supremacy
Clause requires that state law give way.8 1 Similarly, one could argue
that state courts are intended to engage in independent analysis of
federal questions only if no lower federal court has done so. Once
Congress established a federal judicial system charged with deciding
questions about the meaning of federal law in the first instance, federal
judges were arguably intended to take the lead from state courts,
meaning that state judges are no longer free to reach independent
conclusions about the meaning of federal law.
b. The Evolution of State JudicialElections
State judges today may be less reliable protectors of federal
claims of right than in the past as a result of developments in the
process by which states select their judges. Although many states have
long relied on elections to fill judgeships, in recent years these elections
have become increasingly politicized. Elected judges must fundraise
and campaign for office as never before, raising the concern that they
are biased in favor of the special interests that contribute and campaign
on their behalf, and that they will hesitate to take positions that might
be used against them in an upcoming election. 82 Numerous studies
demonstrate that in election years state judges are more likely to
impose the death penalty and longer prison sentences than in years
when they are not up for reelection. 83 Political scientists have
demonstrated that out-of-state defendants are treated more harshly by

80. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1030-31 (1967) ("Congress has power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce, but, subject to certain limits, the authority of the states to act within this
sphere of congressional competence remains undiminished until Congress actually exercise its
power; in effect, an act of Congress is required to federalize the area." (footnote omitted)). However,
so-called "field preemption" is a narrow exception to the general rule that state law will only be
preempted by conflicting federal law. See, e.g, Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261,
1264 (2012).
82. See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in
RUNNING

FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL

ELECTIONS 73, 76 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); David Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2006).
83.
See infra Part V.A.4.
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elected judges than appointed judges. 84 Indeed, elected judges
themselves concede that elections affect their decisionmaking. 85 In
short, state courts today may be less willing to protect unpopular groups
or vindicate unpopular federal rights-particularly the rights of
defendants in criminal cases. Of course, there have been other periods
in our nation's history when state courts were unreliable, but in the new
era of big-money, high-salience judicial elections, some scholars (and
judges) have begun to question the quality of state court justice.86
These problems are exacerbated by the Supreme Court's
inability to review most state court decisions. As James Pfander has
noted, the state courts "play a vastly different role in the adjudication
of federal issues than they did during the early Republic" because they
now "enjoy far greater decisional independence."8 7 In the nation's
formative years, state courts were subject to as-of-right review in the
Supreme Court for denying any federal claim of right. For many years,
the Supreme Court had the capacity to review most major state court
decisions on questions of federal law and thus served as a general
supervisor of the state courts. Today, the Supreme Court reviews an
average of only twelve state court decisions each term, meaning that
''state courts . . . exercise final authority in virtually every federal
question case that comes before them."88 In this changed world, the
lower federal courts arguably should take the lead in interpreting
federal law, even if that was not the role initially intended for them.
3. Rebutting Counterarguments
The courts and commentators who declare that state courts have
no obligation to follow lower federal court precedent make two
observations. First, they note that state courts are constitutionally

84. See Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The PoliticalEconomy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 163, 186 (1999).
85. See infra Part V.A.4.
86. See Erwin Chemerinksy, EvaluatingJudicialCandidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1988
(1988) ("I strongly favor the abolition of judicial elections in all states."); Sandra Day O'Connor,
How
to
Save
Our Courts, PARADE,
Feb.
24,
2008,
available at https://
justicebeginshere.wordpress.com/tag/justice-sandra-day-oconnor/,
archived at http://perma.cc/
8ZZ5-NMMZ (criticizing judicial elections as undermining judicial independence); Chief Justice
Margaret H. Marshall, President of the Conference of Chief Justices, Remarks to the American
Bar Association House of Delegates 5-6 (Feb. 16, 2009) (quoting Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as
calling judicial elections the "single greatest threat to judicial independence"), available at http://
ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdmlref/collection/ctadmin/id/1407 (noting that increased involvement of
interest groups in judicial elections increases the risk that "judges will tailor their decisions to the
sources of their financial and electoral support"). See generally Goldberg, supra note 82, at 91.
87.
PFANDER, supra note 16, at 90.
88. Id.
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empowered-indeed, required-to hear and resolve questions about the
meaning of federal law, which these commentators assume means that
state courts are intended to be independent interpreters of federal law.
Second, lower federal courts do not review state court decisions, and
therefore the lower federal courts have no power to reverse a state
court's decision on a question of federal law. 89 Accordingly, these jurists
and scholars declare that state courts are federal courts' equals when it
comes to interpreting federal law and thus cannot be required to adhere
to lower federal court precedent.90 As explained below, however, that
logic does not necessarily follow.
a. The Significance of ConcurrentJurisdiction
That state and federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over federal claims does not mean that state courts should be
completely independent of the lower federal courts when deciding cases.
After all, federal courts regularly decide state law claims, and yet
federal courts are subordinate to the state courts in the interpretation
of state law. Erie requires federal courts to follow the state high court's
interpretation of state common law, statutes, and constitutional law,
even if the federal judge disagrees with the state court's view. 91 Despite
sharing jurisdiction over state law, federal courts are clearly inferior to
state courts when interpreting state law and thus concurrent
jurisdiction does not imply equal interpretive status.
Furthermore, lots of state and federal nonjudicial actors are also
obligated to interpret and apply federal law in the first instance, and
yet lower federal courts have the authority to dictate the meaning of
federal law for these officials. For example, the landmark case of Ex
parte Young 92 empowers lower federal courts to impose their view of
federal law on state executive branch officials. Exparte Young held that
a federal trial court may enjoin a state attorney general from enforcing
a state statute that the federal court concluded was unconstitutional,
89.
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 39, at 825 ("[S]tate and territorial judges are not bound
by precedents established by courts that do not have the authority to review those judges'
decisions, since . .. authority to establish precedent follows the path of appellate review."); Robert
A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of FederalLaw: The Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L. REV. 703, 742
(1995) (noting that a state court deciding federal issues does not have to follow inferior federal
courts in its region because state court decisions are not subject to review by the lower federal
courts). As Professor David Shapiro acknowledged, habeas corpus "muddie[s]" this argument by
giving federal courts quasi-appellate review of state court decisions. Shapiro, supranote 4, at 771.
90.
See, e.g., Iowa Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 232 N.W. 445, 454 (Iowa 1930) (stating that state
and lower federal courts are "as to the laws of the United States, co-ordinate courts"); Shapiro,
supra note 4, at 771.
91.
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
92.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).

2015]

INFERIORITY COMPLEX

77

ignoring the contrary views of state officials and suggesting distrust of
state judges. In fact, Justice Harlan's dissent objected to this "radical
change in our governmental system" that would "enable the
subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official action
of the States as if they were 'dependencies' or provinces."93 Similarly,
state officials can be held liable for violating federal constitutional
rights, as long as those rights are "clearly established" by the Supreme
Court or by the lower federal courts. 9 4
In sum, state courts' presumptive exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction suggests that they are constitutionally adequate fora for
hearing and resolving federal claims, but this exercise of power cannot
be cited as evidence that they are equal to federal courts when doing so.
b. The Significance of Revisory Review
Some courts and commentators contend that the obligation to
obey precedent relates directly to the power of revisory review. 5 That
is, a "higher" court's decisions are binding on a "lower" court if it has
the power to review and reverse the lower court. Indeed, it is thought
that the power to review and reverse is what renders one court "higher"
in the first place. Because state courts are not subject to review by the
lower federal courts, these experts conclude that state courts have no
obligation to follow the precedent of the lower federal courts.9 6
There is logic to this position. As a functional matter, the duty
to follow precedent can best be enforced-perhaps can only be

93. Id. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (holding that a state official can be
held liable for violating an individual's constitutional rights if there is "controlling authority in
[the] jurisdiction at the time of the incident that clearly established the rule" or if there is a
"consensus of cases of persuasive authority"); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1997)
(holding that a right may be "clearly established" based on lower court consensus, even if there is
no Supreme Court decision directly on point).
95. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir. 1970)
("[B]ecause lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of
lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts."); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View
of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 258 n.170
(1985):
Current rules of precedent are thus governed not by any inherent judicial hierarchy in
the structure of the Constitution or by the natural 'supremacy' of the Supreme Court
but by the mechanisms of review that Congress provides for: state courts are currently
bound to follow Supreme Court precedent because of the simple fact that if they do not,
they can be reversed.
(citation omitted).
96. Id.; see also People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936, 940 (Colo. 1990) ("Lower federal courts do
not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts and their decisions are not conclusive on state
courts, even on questions of federal law.").
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enforced-by a reviewing court. Furthermore, under our current
system, precedential force and appellate structure are closely related.
District courts are not bound by each other's rulings but follow the
decisions of the federal courts of appeals that review them. The federal
circuits are free to disagree with one another but must fall in line
behind the Supreme Court. The state court systems have a similar
structure and follow similar precedential rules.9 7 In such hierarchical
systems, lower or "inferior" courts are obligated to follow the precedent
of only those courts above them in the appellate hierarchy.
The obligation to follow precedent does not perfectly track the
power of revisory review, however. 98 After all, state courts do not review
decisions by federal courts, and yet Erie requires the federal courts to
follow state high court precedent on questions of state law. Precedent
set by a three-judge panel on a federal court of appeals binds all
subsequent panels in that federal circuit, despite the lack of revisory
review, unless and until the court sits en banc to reverse the original
panel's decision. 99 And the Federal Circuit asserts that its precedent on
questions over which it has jurisdiction, such as patent law, bind all the
other federal courts of appeals, despite its inability to review those
courts.10 0 Similarly, most courts and commentators conclude that state
courts are obligated to follow Supreme Court precedent even in cases in
which there will be no possibility of Supreme Court review-for
example, when there is an independent and adequate state law ground
for the decision or when Congress has eliminated the subject area from
Supreme Court review.'o"
Moreover, in determining the constitutional relationship
between state and federal courts, the important question is whether the
Constitution would permit the lower federal courts to review state court
decisions on questions of federal law if Congress so chose. And clearly
the Constitution does. Alexander Hamilton assumed as much in

97. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1458 n.16 (2010).
98.
Caminker, supranote 39, at 824 n.31. But see Jehovah's Witnesses v. King Cnty. Hosp.,
278 F. Supp. 488, 504-06 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam) ("In this special three-judge court case
we are not bound by any judicial decisions other than those of the United States Supreme Court.").
99. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1017-18
(2003) (describing the rule "that one panel cannot overrule another," which is followed in every
circuit).
100. See, e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1357-58 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (en banc).
101. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 39, at 867-69. But see Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing
Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION
33, 85 (1989) (arguing that a state court is not "constitutionally insubordinate" if it chooses not to
follow precedent of a higher federal court).
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FederalistNo. 82, when he wrote that he could perceive "no impediment
to the establishment of an appeal from the State courts to the
subordinate national tribunals." 102 In fact, such "appeals" occur today
in the form of habeas corpus petitions filed by prisoners seeking review
of their state court convictions.10 3 As the Supreme Court explained in
Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., "Congress, if so minded,
may explicitly empower district courts to oversee certain state-court
judgments and has done so, most notably, in authorizing federal habeas
review of state prisoners' petitions."10 4 The federal courts' constitutional
capacity to review and reverse state court decisions on questions of
federal law further suggests that the Constitution places the lower
federal courts above state courts on matters of federal law, despite the
fact that the lower federal courts typically do not review state court

decisions.
B. The Disconnect Between Hierarchy and Precedent
In any case, whether state courts are equal or subordinate to
lower federal courts may be irrelevant to the question whether state
courts must follow lower federal court precedent. As Evan Caminker
observed, there is "nothing inherently illogical about 'coordinate' courts
binding one another." 05 As already noted, a decision by one three-judge
panel will bind all future panels in that circuit, even though the first
panel is not hierarchically superior to those panels that face the issue
in the future.1 06 Likewise, the Federal Circuit considers its decisions on
matters of patent law to bind the other federal courts of appeals, even
though the federal courts of appeals are not subordinate to the Federal
Circuit.1 0 As these examples illustrate, binding precedent may have as
much to do with administrative values-such as certainty and
finality-as hierarchical status.
As discussed in more detail in Part V, for purely practical
reasons, it makes sense for the federal courts of appeals to bind those
state courts within their circuit. The federal courts of appeals have a
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
103. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 254 (1988)
(explaining that "through habeas review" the lower federal courts "in effect exercis[e] appellate
jurisdiction over state criminal proceedings"); Zeigler, supra note 7, at 1215 ("Although a habeas
action is technically a collateral proceeding, as a practical matter the lower federal courts exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the state courts in such cases.").
104. 544 U.S. 280, 292 n.8 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)).
105. Caminker, supra note 39, at 871.
106. See Barrett, supranote 99, at 1017-18.
107. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
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broader geographic jurisdiction than state courts, and thus it would be
natural to let them take the lead in establishing the interpretation of
federal law for a particular region rather than let state courts develop
piecemeal rules that differ from the regional appellate court and the
neighboring state courts. Indeed, if a state court differs from the federal
circuit in its region, it may put its citizens in the awkward position of
trying to obey conflicting interpretations of the same federal
obligation-a result that should be avoided whenever possible. 108
Of course, there are also benefits from obtaining a diversity of
views about the meaning of federal law, which is why the Supreme
Court likes to let federal questions "percolate" in the lower courtsincluding the state courts-before it will grant a writ of certiorari to
resolve the disagreement. State courts provide a different perspective
on federal law, and their views may assist the Supreme Court in its
decisionmaking. But it is not obvious that these benefits outweigh the
high costs of intrastatejudicial conflict, as discussed further in Part V.
Nor is it clear what result the Framers intended. Thus, even assuming
commentators are correct that state courts are "coordinate," that status
does not tell us whether the Constitution could be read to require state
courts to follow lower federal court precedent.
C. Conclusion
As this Part has shown, the generally accepted rule that state
courts are free to ignore lower federal court precedent rests on
surprisingly shaky foundations. The Constitution's text provides little
evidence to support the rule, and good arguments can be made that
state courts are less competent than federal courts at interpreting
federal law, even if one concedes that they are constitutionally adequate
fora in which to resolve disputes about federal questions. Furthermore,
the expansion of the lower federal courts, both in size and in the scope
of their jurisdiction, accompanied by the Supreme Court's shrinking
docket, further supports the conclusion that state courts should follow
the lower federal courts' lead. Even if these arguments are not clear
winners, they are as strong as the arguments justifying our current
system in which two courts in the same geographic region are allowed
to reach different results about the meaning of the same federal law.

&

108. In a previous article, I asserted that courts and commentators have at times overvalued
nationwide uniformity in the interpretation of federal law. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing
Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1581 (2008). However, I also explained that the arguments in
favor of intrastate uniformity are strong, especially where the conflict puts a state's citizens in the
untenable position of having to comply with two inconsistent legal standards. See id. at 1584
nn. 48-50
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Admittedly, however, the constitutional case is not
overwhelming, and so the large majority of state courts that have long
considered themselves free to disregard the lower federal courts are
unlikely to change their minds now. 109 Thus, whatever the merits of
their position, most state courts will not voluntarily give up their power
to engage in independent interpretation of federal law and start
following lower federal court precedent instead. The more important
question, then, is whether Congress or the Supreme Court could
establish a rule requiring state courts to obey lower federal court
precedent.
IV. FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE STATE COURTS TO FOLLOW
LOWER FEDERAL COURT PRECEDENT
This Part analyzes the sources of Congress's and the Supreme
Court's authority over state courts, as well as the limits on that
authority imposed by state sovereignty and norms of judicial
independence, to determine whether these federal institutions could
require state courts to follow lower federal court precedent on the
meaning of federal law.
A. The Sources of Congress'sAuthority to Control the Rules of
Precedent in State Courts
1. The Inferior Tribunals Clause and the Sweeping Clause
Congress can require state courts to follow precedent set by the
lower federal courts pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 power to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," coupled with its
authority under the Sweeping Clause to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States."11 0 The Inferior Tribunals Clause enables Congress
to implement the Madisonian Compromise's invitation to create the
lower federal courts and, together with the Sweeping Clause, gives
Congress the power to control lower federal courts' jurisdiction and
other aspects of those courts' day-to-day operations. Together, they are
the source of Congress's authority to assign federal causes of action
concurrently to state and federal courts and to give the defendant a

109. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of state court treatment of lower federal court
precedent.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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right to remove such cases to federal court, or to provide for exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases in federal court."'
Several legal scholars have already concluded that the Sweeping
Clause permits Congress to establish the rules of precedent for federal
courts-rules that are currently controlled by federal common law. In
an article devoted to the subject, John Harrison states that Congress
has "substantial authority" over the rules of precedent in federal court,
though he concedes that Congress cannot manipulate precedent in ways
that undermine judicial independence or control outcomes. 112 As
Harrison points out, Congress already exercises considerable control
over the lower federal courts through legislation dictating their size,
structure, jurisdiction, and budget. Congress has the authority to
establish the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence that govern proceedings in federal court. In light of Congress's
control over many aspects of the lower federal courts' day-to-day
functions, Congress must be able to exercise similar authority over the
rules of precedent they follow.
Whether Congress can mandate the rules of precedent for state
courts poses a different, and harder, problem. 113 Congress likely cannot
control the rules of precedent for state courts on questions of state law
because such legislation would bear no relationship to Congress's power
to create the lower federal courts under the Inferior Tribunals Clause,
or any other suitable federal interest. 114 But legislation requiring state
courts to follow lower federal court precedent on questions of federal
law could be justified as "necessary and proper" to realize Congress's
goals in establishing the lower federal courts in the first place. Congress
created the lower federal courts for many reasons, including promoting
uniform interpretation of federal law and protecting federal law against
a hostile reception in state courts. Requiring state courts to follow lower

111. FALLON ETAL., supranote 10, at 745.
112. John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503,
505-06 (2000); see also Caminker, supra note 39, at 838 ("I presume that the Necessary and Proper
Clause allows Congress to command the federal courts to follow precedents established by other
courts."). But see Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMM. 191 (2001) (concluding that Congress lacks authority to
regulate federal courts' use of precedent).
113. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947, 949 (2001) ("The bounds of federal authority over the way state courts conduct their business
have remained undefined for over 200 years.").
114. Cf. id. at 951 n.14 (citing articles expressing a range of opinions on the question whether
Congress can regulate procedures for state courts in state law cases).
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federal court precedent would serve both purposes and thus would be
within Congress's constitutional authority.11 5
Furthermore, Congress's greater authority to exclude state
courts from hearing federal question cases altogether suggests it has
the lesser authority to control the methods by which state courts decide
those cases, as long as those methods are reasonable and related to
Congress's purpose in creating the lower federal courts. The Court
applied similar logic in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi,1 16 where it explained that because Congress could preempt

state public utility regulation entirely, Congress could require the state
administrative agency to follow "certain procedural minima as that
body goes about undertaking its tasks."1 17 Finally, because Congress
can allow appeals from state court decisions to the lower federal courts,
which would enable the lower federal courts to reverse state court
judgments, Congress should have the related power to require state
courts to adhere to lower federal court precedent.11 8

115. Interestingly, Congress took the opposite tack in the AEDPA, impliedly freeing the state
courts from any obligation to follow lower federal court precedent in state criminal proceedings.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). AEDPA limits habeas relief to claims adjudicated on the merits in
state court only if the state court issued a decision that was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States." Id. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). In other words, AEDPA makes clear that
state courts in criminal proceedings can disregard lower federal court precedent-even that set by
its regional federal court of appeals-without fear that its decisions will be overturned by a federal
court sitting in habeas.
116. 456U.S. 742, 771 (1982) ("If Congress can require a state administrative body to consider
proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a preemptible field-and we
hold today that it can-there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress' requiring certain
procedural minima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks.")
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text for discussion of Congress's power to
establish appeals from state courts to lower federal courts.
James Pfander contends that state courts should be viewed as lower federal courts when
deciding cases about the meaning of federal law. See PFANDER, supra note 16. If he is correct, the
case for Congress's power to control state court precedent becomes even stronger. Pfander argues
that the Inferior Tribunals Clause permits Congress to "appoint" state courts to act as inferior
federal tribunals for the purpose of hearing cases that fall within the federal courts' Article III
subject-matter jurisdiction, noting that Alexander Hamilton cited the Inferior Tribunals Clause in
FederalistNo. 81 as the source of Congress's power to require state courts to hear matters arising
under federal law. Indeed, Pfander contends that Congress implicitly designated state tribunals
as inferior federal courts by giving state courts concurrent jurisdiction to hear cases arising under
federal law.
Under Pfander's theory, state and lower federal courts can be viewed as all serving in one
system-that of the "inferior" federal tribunals-making it easier to justify Congress's control over
the force of precedent in state courts. Under current practice, district courts are bound by the
precedent set by the circuit court that exercises jurisdiction over its region; if state courts are
simply another type of federal tribunal, they can just as easily be bound. Moreover, if state courts
have the same status as the congressionally created lower federal courts when hearing federal
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2. Congress's Power to Control Interpretation of Its Enactments
In addition to its power under the Inferior Tribunals Clause and
the Sweeping Clause, Congress has significant authority to control the
interpretive rules applied to its own statutory enactments. Accordingly,
Congress can define the terms used, and it can mandate (or prohibit)
use of specific textual canons or interpretive theories by those charged
with construing its statutes." 9 In other words, interpretive rules are
part and parcel of the statute and thus are within Congress's Article I,
Section 7 authority to enact legislation.
Indeed, as Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz convincingly argued a
decade ago, Congress could enact a statute containing broad rules of
statutory interpretation to be applied by all courts when interpreting
the entire U.S. Code-a "Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation."1 20
Admittedly, as Rosenkranz acknowledges, there are some limits on
Congress's power over statutory interpretation.121 For example,
Congress cannot seek to control substantive outcomes in individual
cases through the guise of interpretive rules, and it cannot change rules
of interpretation that are themselves constitutionally required. For the
most part, however, Congress can mandate how courts should interpret
its enactments.
Because Congress has broad authority to control the manner in
which the federal and state courts interpret its statutes, it follows that
Congress may delegate the interpretive task to a third party and then
require courts to follow that third party's interpretations. In fact,
Chevron deference does just that.1 22 Chevron requires federal courts to
adopt agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutesdeference that is justified, in part, on the ground that Congress likely
intended administrative agencies to take the lead from courts in such
situations.123 State courts have concluded that they are also bound by
questions, then Congress can control precedent in state courts to the same degree that it can
control such precedent in federal court.
119. See, e.g., The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
120. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, FederalRules of StatutoryInterpretation,115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2108 (2002) (asserting that a "state court could not ignore federal . . . interpretive
instructions, any more than it could ignore federal substantive rules").
121. Id. at 2108-09.
122. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def, Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
123. Id. at 843-44:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.
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Chevron deference, even though state courts generally do not follow
other interpretive principles employed by the Supreme Court when
construing federal law.1 24 Chevron is therefore strong evidence that
Congress can require state and federal courts alike to defer to another
institution's views on the meaning of federal law.
Of course, Chevron requires only that courts defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of statutes and does not compel courts to adopt
interpretations they believe are obviously incorrect, and thus it is less
intrusive than a rule mandating that state courts adopt lower federal
court precedent. Congress has never attempted to do what is suggested
here-a rule requiring state courts to follow lower federal courts'
interpretation of federal law. But the analogy with Chevron nonetheless
provides further support for Congress's power to mandate that states
abide by lower federal court precedent when interpreting federal
statutes. 125
B. The Sources of the Supreme Court's Authority to Control the Rules
of Precedent in State Courts
The Supreme Court can also require state courts to follow lower
federal court precedent pursuant to its authority to create procedural
federal common law governing the litigation of federal questions.' 26
The Supreme Court clearly has the authority to create
procedural common law for the lower federal courts, as illustrated by
its precedent establishing rules of abstention,1 27 exhaustion, 2 8 res
judicata, 129 and forum non conveniens.1s0 Most rules of precedent are
common-law rules.13 1 Although many of these rules were inherited from
the English legal system or developed organically over time, the
Supreme Court occasionally pronounces on the precedential force of its

124. See Gluck, supra note 4, at 1990 n.320.
125. Of course, any authority Congress has to control precedent as an aspect of its lawmaking
power does not extend to requiring the states to follow lower federal court precedent on matters of
constitutional law.
126. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv.
L. REV. 881, 885-86 (1986) (discussing the two-fold inquiry used to determine whether federal
common law governs those "legal issues thought to require federal solutions").
127. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
128. Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
129. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001).
130. Amy Coney Barrett, ProceduralCommon Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 826 (2008).
131. See, e.g., id. at 828 (describing the principles of stare decisis and stating that the
"doctrine is generally regarded as a species of common law"); Harrison, supra note 112, at 525-29
(describing the rules of precedent as "federal common law").
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own opinions as well as those of the lower courts. 132 Accordingly, the
Court can set the precedential rules that govern in the lower federal
courts.
Again, the harder question is whether the Court's commonlawmaking authority over the inferior federal courts extends to
controlling the weight of precedent on federal questions in state
courts-a question that has rarely been addressed in the academic
literature. 133 At least when state courts are presiding over federal
claims, however, the Court should have the power to impose procedural
rules on state courts as part of its obligation to oversee adjudication of
federal law.
According to James Pfander, state courts are quasi-federal
courts when they preside over questions of federal law, suggesting that
the Supreme Court has the same authority to regulate state court
procedures in federal question cases as it does to regulate procedures
used by the lower federal courts. 134 But even if one does not agree with
Pfander's view that state courts take on the status of federal courts in
federal question cases, the Supreme Court still must be able to ensure
that state courts properly exercise their vital role as courts of original
jurisdiction over cases raising federal questions. The Supreme Court's
"essential functions" are to ensure the uniformity and supremacy of
that federal law, 135 which includes overseeing the method by which
those claims are heard and decided in courts of first instance-whether
those courts are federal or state.
The Court has acted in the past to protect federal law from state
courts. Pursuant to this common-lawmaking authority, the Court has
altered or abolished state rules that it perceived as creating needless
barriers to hearing and deciding federal claims. For example, in Dice v.
Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., the Court required states to use
juries, not judges, to decide all factual claims in a case brought under

.

132. For example, the Supreme Court has frequently announced that district court opinions
lack precedential force in any court, including within the issuing district. See, e.g., Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) ("A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding
precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same
judge in a different case." (citation and internal quotation omitted)). Occasionally the Court has
even tried to limit the precedential force of its own opinions, see e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
109 (2000) (per curiam) ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances... ."), though
without much success. See Chad Flanders, Please Don't Cite This Case! The PrecedentialValue of
Bush v. Gore, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141 (2006).
133. Barrett, supranote 130, at 832 ("[I]t is not clear whether the Supreme Court can impose
rules of procedural common law upon the states. .
134. See PFANDER, supranote 16.
135. Leonard G. Ratner, CongressionalPower over the Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201-02 (1960).
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the Federal Employer Liability Act.136 And in Felder v. Casey the Court
barred the state from imposing a 120-day notice of claim requirement
on cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though the state applied
that same deadline to claims under state law. 13 7 Although these
decisions acknowledged that state courts normally need not "mimic
federal courts procedurally when they hear federal matters,"13 8 the
Supreme Court carved out exceptions to that principle when necessary
to protect federal interests.
In short, there is historical precedent to support the Supreme
Court's power to craft federal common-law rules regarding the role of
lower federal court opinions in state court decisionmaking. The impetus
for doing so would be similar to that which inspired the Court to alter
state procedural rules hindering review of federal claims. Just as the
Court has displaced state procedural rules that undermine federal law,
it can displace state practices regarding the force of lower federal court
precedent if it thinks such rules would promote the goals of protecting
the uniformity and supremacy of federal law. 139
C. Limits on Congress's and the Supreme Court's Authority to Control
the Rules of Precedent in State Courts
Congress and the Supreme Court's constitutional authority to
dictate the weight of lower federal court precedent in state court is not
without limits, however. The exercise of that power is constrained both
by the need to respect state sovereignty and by judicial independence.
Accordingly, neither Congress nor the Court can regulate state court
use of precedent in a manner that seeks to control case outcomes or
manipulate the judicial decisionmaking process.
1. Limitations Imposed by State Sovereignty
State sovereignty is the most obvious impediment to any rule
requiring state court fidelity to lower federal court opinions. State
judges are a part of the machinery of state government. Their offices
136. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
137. 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); see also F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 771 (1982)
(holding that Congress could require a state administrative agency to follow "certain procedural
minima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks").
138. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 178.
139. Amy Coney Barrett has suggested that the Court's power to create federal common-law
rules of procedure may even exceed Congress's power to do so on rare occasions. See Barrett, supra
note 130, at 816-17 (arguing that there is a "small core of inherent procedural authority that
Congress cannot reach").
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are created by state law, usually by the state's constitution, and they
are placed in office through either appointment by the citizens'
representatives in the political branches or popular election. A federal
statute or common-law rule mandating that state judges follow a lower
federal court's interpretations of federal law appears to be the kind of
"commandeering" of state officers that the Constitution forbids.
Interfering with the work of these state actors by requiring them to
adopt the views of federal officials with whom they may disagree
smacks of constitutionally forbidden interference with state
sovereignty.
As every student of federal courts knows, however, state judges
stand in a different position vis-A-vis the federal government than do
other state actors. Congress cannot force state executive branch officials
to implement federal laws,1 40 and it cannot delegate federal lawmaking
to state legislatures.141 In contrast, the Constitution relies on state
courts to entertain cases about the meaning of federal law. Indeed, the
Madisonian Compromise assumes state courts are available to hear all
cases falling under Article III's subject matter headings, save the few
over which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction.1 4 2 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has concluded that state courts are constitutionally
compelled to hear and decide federal questions and to do so using
federal procedures when necessary to protect the substance of the
federal rights at stake.1 43
Furthermore, Congress's power to take cases away from the
state courts is also widely accepted. By statute, Congress has vested
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over federal crimes, among
other subjects, and Congress could amend 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to give
federal courts exclusive federal jurisdiction over all federal cases if it so
chose. In light of this greater power to take federal cases entirely away
from the state courts, Congress arguably has the lesser, and related,
power to require states to follow lower federal court precedent when
doing so.

140. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
141. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
142. In New York v. United States, which struck down federal legislation attempting to
"commandeer" a state legislature, the Court distinguished Testa v. Katt on the ground that
"[flederal statutes enforceable in state court do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but
this sort of federal 'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause. No
comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to
legislate." 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992).
143. See New York, 505 U.S. 144; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see also Bellia, supra
note 113, at 958 ("[I]nsofar as Congress may require state courts to enforce federal claims, it has
some authority to 'commandeer' them.").
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The counterargument, however, is that Congress's binary
authority to give or take away state courts' jurisdiction over federal
question cases does not encompass the arguably more intrusive
requirement that they decide these cases as another decisionmaker-a
federal decisionmaker-prefers. Indeed, this could be just the kind of
co-opting of state government that is most offensive from a federalism
perspective, in that it appropriates the machinery of state government
for federal ends and does so in ways that cloud the accountability of
state and federal actors alike. For example, if state courts were bound
to follow federal precedent, a New York citizen unhappy with a New
York state court judge's decision finding a federal constitutional right
to same-sex marriage might be confused about whether that decision is
the product of the state court's independent decision or the federal
court's mandate.
And yet it seems inevitable that the intertwined federal and
state court systems blur the lines of accountability. For better or worse,
the Framers chose to impose a cooperative federalism model onto the
state courts and then to live with the confusion that follows when state
actors are forced to carry out federal bidding. The Constitution's
creation of a federal judiciary with the last word on the meaning of
federal law necessarily displaces state judicial power to some degree.
After all, state courts face the prospect of reversal should they flout
Supreme Court precedent when interpreting federal law.144 So the
question is not whether state courts retain complete independence to
interpret federal law but rather whether it would impermissibly
intrude on state sovereignty to require state judges to follow the
precedent set by the lower federal courts as well as the Supreme Court.
Because state courts are not the last word on the meaning of federal
law, it seems hard to argue that state sovereignty bars Congress or the
Supreme Court from requiring that they adhere to the lower federal
courts' views on federal questions.
2. Limitations Imposed by Judicial Independence
A statute requiring state courts to follow lower federal court
precedent arguably interferes with the state court's independent
exercise of its judicial power. The few academics to have addressed
Congress's power to control the force of precedent have focused on the
power of Congress to regulate precedent in federal courts, not state
courts. Nonetheless, their analysis is relevant because they focus not
only on separation of powers issues but also on the question whether
144. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).

90

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1:53

control over the force of precedent is a part of the core of "judicial power"
that all courts must be allowed to exercise without interference.1 45
Professor John Harrison addressed Congress's power to alter the
rules of vertical stare decisis in the federal courts.1 46 He concludes that
the current rules of precedent are the product of federal common law
and thus can be altered by Congress pursuant to its authority under the
Sweeping Clause.1 47 For Professor Harrison, controlling the strength of
precedent is not an essential attribute of the judicial power but rather
resembles the type of evidentiary or procedural rule over which
Congress has long exercised control. Harrison concedes that Congress
would overstep were it to manipulate the rules of precedent to control
case outcomes and the development of doctrine, but he argues that the
mere potential for abuse does not deprive Congress of the authority to
regulate such rules in a reasonable manner.1 48 Thus, Harrison
concludes that Congress could enact laws making district court
decisions binding precedent, or establish a rule of intercircuit stare
decisis, all without transgressing constitutional boundaries.1 49 Under
that same logic, Congress would be able to control state court rules of
precedent without interfering with judicial independence.
United States v. Klein,15 0 a Reconstruction Era case, is also
relevant to the question. Congress had enacted a law requiring that
persons whose property was seized by the Union during the Civil War
be compensated if they could prove that they had remained loyal to the
Union. The courts had awarded compensation to former Confederate
sympathizers pardoned by the President, concluding that such
individuals qualified as loyal. Unhappy with this result, Congress
passed a new law providing that a court must treat a presidential
pardon as conclusive evidence that the individual in question was
disloyal and directed the Court to find that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
any pending claim based on a presidential pardon. Klein struck down
that statute because it sought to "prescribe rules of decision to the

145. Although state court judges generally lack the life tenure and salary protections that
insulate the decisional independence of federal courts, they are nonetheless generally viewed as
impartial adjudicators who decide cases free from outside interference. Whether that view
comports with reality is a debatable question. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
146. See Harrison, supra note 112.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ...
[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.").
148. See Harrison, supra note 112, at 531.
149 Id. at 535-36.
150. 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 128 (1872).
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Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it."151
Could a federal law purporting to control the weight of judicial
precedent be struck down for similar reasons?
Klein's reasoning is far from clear, and so it is hard to apply its
murky rationale to subsequent cases. 152 But in Klein it appeared that
the Court was troubled by Congress's attempt to control the application
of a substantive standard in particular cases, thereby threatening
judicial independence. A generally applicable law controlling the use of
precedent in state court would not raise the same concerns. Indeed, a
statute dictating the force of precedent in state court is arguably no
more an interference with judicial decisionmaking than a rule of
evidence or a standard of review, which all agree Congress can control.
As long as state courts are free to apply these generally applicable rules
without interference, they maintain the independence that is essential
for any healthy judiciary.
D. Conclusion
This Part concludes that either Congress or the Supreme Court
can control the force of federal precedent in state courts if they wish to
do so. When state courts hear federal questions, they are engaged in an
activity that automatically falls under the authority of the federal
government. Furthermore, regulating the state courts is essential to
protecting the Supreme Court's authority to take appeals from state
courts on questions of federal law. Thus, neither state sovereignty nor
concerns for judicial independence bar these federal institutions from
doing so.

V. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INTERSYSTEMIC STARE DECISIS
Assuming that Congress and the Supreme Court have the
constitutional authority to control the force of lower federal court
precedent in state court, the next question is whether either institution
should do so. Although there are obvious costs to the current system
that allows state courts to differ from lower federal courts on the
meaning of federal law, there are also benefits to giving state courts
that measure of independence. Analyzing these costs and benefits will
help to determine whether a federal rule establishing the force of lower

151. Id. at 146.
152. FALLON ET AL., supra note 10, at 303 (describing the Court's opinion as "rais[ing] more
questions than it answers").
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federal court precedent in state court would be worthwhile and, if so,
what the contours of that rule should look like.
After engaging in this calculus, this Part concludes that
disuniformity among regions is not a cause for concern, but intrastate
disuniformity can cause confusion, create friction between state and
federal court systems, and undermine the rule of law. Thus, either
Congress or the Supreme Court should require that state courts follow
the precedent set by the federal circuit court with jurisdiction over that
state. Such a rule would eliminate the most costly and disruptive
disagreements between state and federal courts, but retain the benefits
of percolation and preserve state court authority to make independent
pronouncements on the meaning of federal law when their regional
federal court of appeals has not yet spoken.
A. The Costs of Allowing State Courts to Diverge from Precedent Set by
Their Regional Federal Court of Appeals
1. Uniformity
Allowing state courts independently to interpret federal law
comes with all the costs that accompany disuniformity. When state
courts differ from federal courts over the meaning of a federal statute
or constitutional provision, citizens are left confused about what the law
requires of them and sometimes bear the added costs of complying with
two (or more) different legal standards. Uniform interpretation of
federal law among state as well as federal courts has long been
recognized as a goal worth pursuing. As far back as Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, Justice Story's majority opinion stressed "the importance, and
even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United
States" and decried the "mischiefs" that would result were the Supreme
Court deprived of its ability to ensure such uniformity by reviewing
state court decisions on federal questions. 153
Yet uniformity should not always be the legal system's first
priority. 154 Uniform interpretation and application of federal law is
often sacrificed for other benefits, such as efficiency, finality, and state
autonomy. 15 5 Indeed, our federal judicial system is structured in ways
that regularly lead to divergent interpretations of the same statute or
153. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48(1816).
154. See Frost, supra note 108.
155. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008) ("This interest in uniformity,
however, does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with
plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal
constitutional guarantees.").
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constitutional provision. District court decisions carry no precedential
weight even within their district, and the lack of intercircuit stare
decisis consistently creates circuit splits that can linger on for years.
Perhaps disuniform interpretations of federal law are the price to be
paid for a large and multitiered legal system. Moreover, disuniformity
among geographic regions can at times be beneficial; for example, it can
allow laws to be tailored to regional circumstances and needs.15 6
However, the disuniformity created by a split between a state
supreme court and its regional federal court of appeals is especially
problematic because it leaves citizens in a single state subject to
conflicting legal standards. Sometimes it is possible to adhere to two
legal standards at the same time-for example, if one court's narrow
interpretation of a law falls within the parameters of another court's
broader interpretation of the same law, then conduct consistent with
the narrower interpretation will satisfy both courts. 15 7 But when the
two rulings are irreconcilable, the citizen is forced to choose whether to
violate either the state court's or the federal court's view of federal law
and then run the risk of being sanctioned by the court that took the
opposing position.
The introduction to this Article provided some examples of
particularly problematic intrastate disuniformity. South Carolina and
West Virginia state courts both exercise personal jurisdiction over a
manufacturer based solely on the stream of commerce of the
manufacturer's goods into their state, even though the Fourth Circuit
has declared that courts lack personal jurisdiction in such cases.' 5 8
Virginia state courts convict defendants for violating a state sodomy
statute that the Fourth Circuit has declared is unconstitutional.15 9
California state courts have concluded that a state law allowing
assignment to avoid certain preferential transfers is not preempted by
federal law, even though the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary. 160

156. Frost, supra note 108.
157. To give a concrete example, if a federal court holds that a search is permissible under the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution but a state court within that jurisdiction holds that
such a search violates that same Amendment, state police officers will be in compliance with both
rulings by forgoing such searches. Cf. Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 92 (2010).
158. Compare Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1994), with
State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading, Co., 666 S.E.2d 218, 222-23 (S.C. 2008), and West Virginia
ex rel. CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen, 441 S.E.2d 658, 660-61 (W. Va. 1994).
159. See Saunders v. Commonwealth, 753 S.E.2d 602, 607-08 (Va. Ct. App. 2014) (following
the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion in McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918 (Va.
2007) that the law is constitutional and rejecting the Fourth Circuit's contrary decision in
MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013)).
160. Compare Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding a California statute is preempted by the Bankruptcy Code), with Credit Managers Ass'n
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All these cases are examples of disruptive intrastate disuniformity that
stems from the current rules allowing state courts to diverge from their
regional court of appeals.
This type of intrastate disuniformity has always been viewed as
a serious problem. It was the impetus for the Erie doctrine, in which the
Court rejected the rule of Swift v. Tyson because it "prevented
uniformity in the administration of the law of the state."1 6 ' Avoiding
intrastate disuniformity was also the basis for the Supreme Court's
holding in Van Dusen v. Barrackthat a transferee court must apply the
same state law that would have been applied by the transferor court, 16 2
and for the decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.
that federal courts must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which they sit.16 3 And it explains why every federal court of appeals has
adopted a rule requiring three-judge panels to follow the precedent set
by a previous panel within the same circuit.1 64 Our federal judicial
system is willing to tolerate disuniformity among the federal courts of
appeals but not disuniformity within a geographic region.16 5 A rule
requiring that state courts follow precedent set by the regional federal
court of appeals would similarly serve that goal.
2. Forum Shopping
Permitting courts in the same geographic region to adopt
different interpretations of the same laws will inevitably lead to forum
shopping. The Supreme Court flagged the problem in Erie, concluding
that the parties would always seek out the more favorable forum if
rights were allowed to "vary according to whether enforcement was
sought in the state or in the federal court." 66
The same forum-selection problem exists in a regime in which
state courts are free to disregard the precedent set by the federal court
for their geographic region. Savvy litigants will know ahead of time
whether the state or the federal system has the more favorable law and
will try to bring or transfer their case into the forum that is best for
of Cal. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 264 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding the
Bankruptcy Code does not preempt the California statute).
161. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938).
162. 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964) ("[W]e should ensure that the 'accident' of federal diversity
jurisdiction does not enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which
could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed.").
163. 313 U.S. 487, 496-498 (1941).
164. See Barrett, supra note 99, at 1017-18 & n.20 (2003) (describing the "rule, followed in
every circuit, that one panel cannot overrule another").
165. See supranotes 154-156 and accompanying text.
166. 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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them. Of course, the Supreme Court might eventually eliminate the
problem by issuing a decision that is binding on all. But splits between
state and federal courts can linger for decades, perhaps never to be
resolved, leaving litigants in the same position as they were before the
Court's 1938 decision in Erie.167 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized as much when it observed: "If [we] refuse to abide by [the
Third Circuit's] conclusions, then the individual to whom we deny relief
need only 'walk across the street' to gain a different result." 168
Admittedly, requiring state courts to follow precedent set by
their regional court of appeals will not put an end to forum shopping.
Litigants may prefer federal or state court because of differences in the
procedural rules, the judges, or the jury pools. 16 9 Forum shopping
between state and federal courts will never be eradicated completely as
long as those courts share jurisdiction and, in any case, can serve the
useful purpose of ensuring that all parties trust the decisionmaker.
However, eliminating intrastate disuniformity will remove the
incentive for a party to seek out a forum because the party prefers that
courts' interpretation of the substantive law, rather than because of
procedural or demographic characteristics that inevitably will vary
between state and federal court.
3. Rule of Law
Allowing courts to adopt different interpretations of the same
legal text is in tension with the rule of law. Differing interpretations of
the same statute or constitutional provision undermine the equality
principle of treating like cases alike and weaken the integrity of the law
itself by suggesting its meaning is not immutable.1 70 Professor Peter
167. See, e.g., supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
168. Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1965).
169. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 415 (2010)
("Divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable
(indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system of federal procedure.").
170. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 165 (1986) (arguing that political morality
"requires government to ... extend to everyone the substantive standards of justice or fairness it
uses for some"); Clermont, supra note 4, at 36:
Likewise under reverse-Erie, there is a federal interest in the uniformity of law applied
in federal and state court. As to forum-shopping, there should still be some desire to
avoid shopping by plaintiffs or defendants between the two systems. As to inequitable
administration of the laws, there is still an unfairness in that certain classes of people
have a choice of court systems.
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 1f, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 1997 (1994) ("[The precept that
like cases should be treated alike .. . [is] rooted both in the rule of law and in Article III's invocation
of the 'judicial Power'. . . ."); Charles Fried, ConstitutionalDoctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1156
(1994) ([Rlespect for precedent protects expectations, engenders reliance, and procures stability,
but it does this first of all by assuring the public that it is rule by law so conceived.").
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Strauss asserted that the Supreme Court's inability to address divisions
among the courts over the meaning of federal law is a "troubling
development[] for a nation committed, as ours is, to the rule of law."' 7

As Evan Caminker explained, if a federal law means "X" when
interpreted by one court but 'T' when interpreted by another, then the
public might presume that the courts are "unprincipled," incompetent,
or that legal reasoning is "indeterminate," which "subverts the courts'
efforts to be seen as oracles of exogenous, objective, and determinant
legal principles." 72
The rule of law values at risk from disuniform interpretation of
federal law should not be overstated, however. Our federal judicial
system allows the circuit courts to reach varying conclusions about the
meaning of federal law that can linger for years, and yet there has been
no apparent damage done to the public's respect for federal law and
federal courts. Moreover, if federal law is truly ambiguous, allowing
courts to reach differing interpretations of that law is perhaps more
honest than presuming there can be only one true interpretation of
open-ended language.
And yet there is something particularly troubling about allowing
different interpretations of the same law to exist within a single state.
When this occurs, the public may take greater notice of the
disuniformity than it would when one federal circuit disagrees with
another. State citizens will have to figure out which court's version of
the law they plan to follow, further focusing public attention on the
judicial disagreement. The divergence between state and federal courts
will inevitably raise the parity issue, causing some to question the
competence of state courts (or, less likely, federal courts) and creating
tension between the two systems. Thus, even if interstate uniformity is
not essential to maintaining rule of law values, intrastate uniformity
may be.
4. Parity
The question of parity between state and federal courts has long
been the subject of debate among legal scholars. The Framers assumed
that state courts would be available to hear federal claims, and federal
courts presume that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
federal claims unless Congress chooses to make federal jurisdiction
171. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096-97,
1116 (1987).
172. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 (1994).

2015]

INFERIORITY COMPLEX

97

exclusive. 7 3 Indeed, many federal claims are embedded within statelaw cases and thus can only be brought in state court under the wellpleaded complaint rule. 174 State courts are presumed to provide an
adequate forum in which to air these claims.
That said, there are good reasons to think that federal judges
are simply better at interpreting federal law than state judges. Federal
claims make up a larger percentage of the federal courts' docket; federal
judges are more likely to have experience with the federal government
than state court judges and thus possess a better understanding of the
goals of federal legislation and the ways in which federal laws play out
"on the ground"; and federal judges have more time and resources to
devote to their cases than do most state judges. 175
Perhaps the most important reason to prefer federal to state
court judges, in at least some cases, is that most state court judges do
not have life tenure and must be either reelected or reappointed to
retain their office. Accordingly, state courts' decisions may be skewed
by political or popular pressure. Studies show that state court judges'
decisions vary considerably depending on whether a plaintiff is a citizen
or noncitizen, or whether an election is pending. A study of seven
thousand tort cases found that the mean damages award against outof-state defendants was $144,970 higher in states with elected
judiciaries than in those with appointed judiciaries, which the authors
speculated was caused by elected judges' incentives to distribute wealth
from nonvoters to voters. 7 6 State judges are more likely to impose the
death penalty and issue significantly longer criminal sentences in
election years.1 77 Indeed, elected state court judges openly admit that
the prospect of reelection affects their decisionmaking.17 8

&

173. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 (1962) ("In considering the
propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court begins with the
presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.").
174. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
175. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 166-67 (1969) (concluding that federal judges have "an expertness in
dealing with questions of federal law' that comes from more extended contact with such questions
than state court judges have"); see also Redish & Muench, supra note 72, at 329-30 (arguing that
federal courts have greater expertise on matters of federal law than state courts).
176. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 162-63, 186 (1999).
177. See, e.g., Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The
Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002) (finding that "criminal defendants were approximately fifteen
percent more likely to be sentenced to death when the sentence was issued during the judge's
election year"); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice
Blind when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004).
178. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77
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Legal scholars are increasingly concerned about the effect of
elections on state judging. As Professor Steven Croley put it, judicial
elections create a "majoritarian difficulty" that is the counterpart to the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" posed by appointed federal judges. 179
Elected judges are pressured to decide cases in ways that their
constituents (or possibly interest groups) will prefer, even when doing
8 0 As many scholars have noted, in recent
so is at odds with the law.o
years, judicial elections have morphed from "sleepy, low key affairs," in
which the incumbent was usually reelected in a low-turnout vote, into
high-profile events.1 8 Judges are raising more money, spending more
on advertising, and benefitting (or suffering) from the attention of
nation-wide interest groups.'18 All of which means that voters are now
paying attention to state judges' voting records as never before.183 For
example, after the Iowa Supreme Court held that the Iowa Constitution
required the state to permit same-sex marriage, interest groups
targeted those Justices who were up for reelection, ultimately defeating
three of them.1 84 One has to assume that their defeat will influence
elected judges facing similar controversial cases in the future.
Requiring state court judges to follow lower federal court
precedent would not completely solve the "majoritarian difficulty," but
it would provide a counterweight to public opinion and possibly even
serve as political cover for controversial decisions, just as Supreme
Court precedent sometimes can.185 If an elected judge's decision is
clearly dictated by binding lower court precedent, she can explain that
she had no choice but to vote in line with the federal court of appeals
for her geographic region, thereby defusing some of her critics.

JUDICATURE 306, 315 (1994) (finding that a "very high percentage of judges . . . say judicial
behavior is shaped by retention elections.").
179. Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995).
180. Id. at 694.
181. Lawrence Baum, JudicialElections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's Perspective,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 16-17 (2003).
182.

See CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OFJUDICIAL ELECTIONS 30-

33 (2009) ("Over the decade of the 1990s, state supreme court races have become more contested,
competitive, and expensive.").
183. See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the MajoritarianDifficulty, 96
VA. L. REV. 719, 733-37 (2010) ("[W]e have entered a 'new era' in judicial elections in which voters
pay for more attention to incumbents' voting records.").
184. A.G. Sulzberger, Ousterof Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,2010,
at Al.
185. Id.; see also Frost & Lindquist, supra note 183, at 758 (describing how elected state
judges can rely on federal decisions as "political cover"); Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme
Court of the United States ProtectingState Judges from PopularDemocracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907,
983 (1997).
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5. Conserving Judicial Resources
Requiring state courts to follow lower federal court precedent
would be more efficient, conserving both state and federal judicial
resources. Under the current system, litigants cannot be sure how a
state court will rule on a question of federal law even after that question
has been definitively resolved by the federal court of appeals for the
region. This uncertainty may inspire litigation by those seeking to take
advantage of the potential divergence between state and federal courts
on the meaning of the federal law-litigation that would not be brought
were state courts bound to follow federal precedent.
Once a case is before a state court system, the state trial and
appellate courts must then devote time and attention to the question,
rather than simply fall in step behind the federal court of appeals.
Finally, if the state court does deviate from the lower federal court, the
conflict may lead the parties to seek review by the Supreme Court.'*6
Although the Supreme Court has the capacity to decide only a few cases
each term, it will have to consider whether to do so, and then potentially
invest time to resolve the dispute, taking up one of the precious few
spots on the Supreme Court's calendar.
Admittedly, conserving judicial resources is not the most
compelling reason for changing longstanding rules of precedent. Our
legal system regularly trades efficiency for fairness, accuracy, and
legitimacy, among other values. As discussed below, the perspective of
state court judges may be valuable to the Supreme Court in resolving
the question. Even if reducing the burdens on federal and state judges
is not the primary reason for changing the current rule, however, it
would nonetheless be a fringe benefit of a world in which state courts
simply followed the lead of their regional federal circuit.
B. The Benefits of Allowing State Courts to Diverge from Precedent Set
by Their Regional Federal Court of Appeals
Most state courts today treat federal appellate precedent as
persuasive, but not binding, authority. 8 7 In other words, they diverge
from the decisions of the lower federal courts only in the fairly small
subset of cases in which they conclude that the federal courts got it very
wrong. Accordingly, requiring intersystemic stare decisis would alter
the outcomes only in those few cases in which state courts strongly
186. SUP. CT. R. 10 (stating that a disagreement between a state and federal court on a
question of federal law is one potential bases for the Supreme Court's decision to grant a petition
for writ of certiorari).
187. See supra Part II.A.
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disagree with their federal counterparts-that is, cases in which there
are likely to be reasonable arguments on either side of the question.188
Arguably, it is in just such cases in which it is most beneficial to allow
state courts to come to their own conclusions about the meaning of
federal law.
1. Percolation
The Supreme Court often allows an issue to percolate in the
lower courts before addressing it, waiting for several federal circuits
and/or state high courts to weigh in before granting certiorari. 8 9 The
Court justifies this delay because the Justices benefit from the
reasoning of the divided lower courts, from observing how the federal
issue arises in a variety of different contexts, and from watching the
lower courts' varied interpretations play out in practice.19 0 Indeed,
"percolation" is cited as one of the reasons to maintain our current
system's lack of intercircuit stare decisis, in which the decision of one
federal circuit does not bind another. Presumably, the Court reaps
similar benefits by allowing the state courts to weigh in on federal
issues as well.191
Input from the state court systems can be particularly valuable
in the development of federal law. State courts provide a unique
regional perspective that is (mostly) absent from federal courts.1 9 2 State
judges are elected or appointed, usually after participating for some
period of time in a state's legal or political system. As a result of this
experience, they have an understanding of how federal regulations,
statutes, and constitutional provisions operate within state government

188. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1156 (1990) (noting that courts disagree with one another in "hard cases").
189. See, e.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 961-63 (1983) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of petitions for writs of certiorari):
My vote to deny certiorari in these cases does not reflect disagreement with Justice
Marshall's appraisal of the importance of the underlying issue .... In my judgment it
is a sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this
Court.
190. See Revesz, supra note 188, at 1156-57 (discussing the benefits of percolation).
191. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 605, 634 (1981) ("Do we not derive enormous benefits from having a variety of
institutional 'sets' within which issues of federal constitutional law are addressed?").
192. Federal district judges are required to reside in or near the district in which they preside,
28 U.S.C. § 134, and thus may have a closer connection to the local population than federal
appellate judges.
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and affect state citizens-knowledge that many federal judges will
lack. 198
Furthermore, percolation benefits more than just the Supreme
Court. Congress can observe the dialogue among the federal and state
courts as well, which then informs the contents of future legislation.194
Most obviously, the lower courts benefit from each other's discussion of
hard questions of federal law. Like the Supreme Court, a federal court
of appeals will gain insights from the decisions of those who have
already grappled with the issue.195
Finally, divergence among state and federal courts is an
important signaling device, alerting future courts to the fact that a legal
question is difficult enough to lead two or more courts to differ from
each other, ensuring that subsequent courts will give the issue special
scrutiny. 196
Although the benefits of percolation are significant, they can be
realized without allowing state courts to differ from the federal court of
appeals for their geographic region. Even without state court input, the
circuit courts can express their different views on the meaning of
federal law, leaving lots of opportunity for the Supreme Court to
observe the various interpretations of federal law play out in practice.
Furthermore, a rule requiring that state courts follow the precedent set
by their regional federal circuit court would still allow state courts to
contribute to the development of federal law because the state courts
193. See Gergory L. Acquaviva & John D. Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on State Supreme
Courts, 39 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1203, 1207-08 (2009) (undertaking a "comprehensive examination
of the demographic and experiential characteristics of all judges on the courts of last resort in the
fifty states" and finding that the "average" state supreme court justice has been "heavily involved
in both the bar and the greater local community," "likely spent some portion, if not all, of his
undergraduate and law school days at a school in the state over which he would eventually
preside," and has "[c]ommunity ties" that "run deep").
194. Rochelle C. Dreyfus, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Federal
Circuit Perspective, 68 SMU L. REV. 505, 523 (2013) (noting that "percolation provides important
information to Congress").
195. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985)
("[A] difficult question is more likely to be answered correctly ifit is allowed to engage the attention
of different sets of judges deciding factually different cases than if it is answered finally by the
first panel to consider it."); Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the
Supreme Court's Responsibilities:An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 719 (1984) ("The
views of the lower courts on a particular legal issue provide the Supreme Court with a means of
identifying significant rulings as well as an experimental base and a set of doctrinal materials
with which to fashion sound binding law."). For a more critical perspective on percolation, compare,
for example, Todd J. Tiberi, Supreme Court Denialsof Certiorariin Conflict Cases: Percolationor
Procrastination?,54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 866-69, 882-91 (1993) (examining the arguments
against percolation).
196. See Revesz, supra note 188, at 1156 ("[The possibility of intercircuit disagreement
provides a simple device for signaling that certain hard cases are worthy of additional judicial
resources.").
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would be free to adopt their own interpretations as long their federal
circuit had not yet weighed in on the question. Thus, most of the
benefits of percolation would remain even were state courts obligated
to follow their regional federal circuit's interpretation of federal law.
2. Autonomy
Allowing state courts to reach independent conclusions about
the meaning of federal law grants state courts a degree of autonomy
and respect, and puts them on equal footing with lower federal courts.
One reason to preserve and protect state sovereignty is to maintain the
quality of state governmental institutions. When the federal
government takes on more authority, it risks hollowing out state
institutions and undermining their place in the civic life of the state. A
rule requiring state courts to adhere to the precedent set by their
regional court of appeals would subordinate state courts to yet another
level of the federal judiciary and would further undermine their
interpretive autonomy. Even if such restrictions on state court
autonomy do not violate constitutionally grounded federalism
principles-and, as discussed in Part III, they likely do not-it is wise
policy to give state courts as much autonomy as possible.
Yet no one claims that obligating federal courts to follow state
court precedent on the meaning of state law is demeaning to the federal
courts or undermines federal judicial autonomy. To the contrary, it may
come as a relief to federal courts that they are not required to grapple
with the meaning of state law in some cases but rather are instructed
to look to state court interpretations of state statutes, regulations,
ordinances, and constitutional provisions. For more than seventy years
federal courts have faithfully followed state court precedent.1 97 Why
should it be demeaning to ask state courts to do the same?
C. Conclusion
As just explained, the greatest costs of the current system arise
when a state court diverges from the federal court of appeals with
jurisdiction over that state, creating two views of federal law that apply
within the same geographic jurisdiction. Either Congress or the
Supreme Court could establish rules of precedent that would require
state courts to follow clear precedent set by its federal circuit, ensuring
intrastate uniformity and avoiding the forum shopping and inequitable
application of the law that would otherwise result.

197.

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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VI. CONCLUSION

This Article examines the weight that state courts give to lower
federal court precedent on questions of federal law and then uses that
issue to explore broader questions about the relationship between state
and lower federal courts. The conventional wisdom is that state courts
are not bound by lower federal court precedent. The rationale for this
conclusion is that state courts are coordinate with lower federal courts
and not subordinate to them. This Article questions the assumption
that state courts have equal status when it comes to interpreting of
federal law. Moreover, this Article asserts that even if state courts are
properly viewed as lower federal courts' equals, there are still good
practical and logistical reasons to require that state courts follow lower
.

federal court precedent-particularly the precedent of the lower federal
courts with jurisdiction over that state.
Certainly, the Madisonian Compromise and the norm of
concurrent state court jurisdiction over federal questions suggest that
state courts are constitutionally adequate fora for the resolution of
federal claims, but the fact that state courts are essential expositors of
federal law does not render them federal courts' equals when doing so.
State courts lack the resources, experience, and insulation from
political pressure that federal courts enjoy-problems that the Framers
of the Constitution recognized and that continue to exist today.
Furthermore, the expansion of the size and jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts over the last two hundred years, coupled with diminished
opportunities for Supreme Court review, suggest that the state courts
should be more deferential to the federal courts of appeals. Finally, for
purely practical reasons involving the need for intrastate uniformity, a
state court should not be free to disregard its own regional court of
appeals when addressing the meaning of federal law.
Although the Constitution does not speak clearly regarding state
courts' relationship to the lower federal courts, nothing in the
Constitution would seem to prevent either Congress or the Supreme
Court from establishing such a rule if they chose. At the very least, such
a rule could prevent a state court from taking positions at odds with its
own regional federal court of appeals, thereby forcing the citizens of a
single state to follow two different interpretations of the same federal
law and creating a "split" that may not be resolved for years in an era
of shrinking Supreme Court dockets. A federal statute or common-law
rule requiring state courts to follow lower federal court precedent in
some cases would help to clarify the appropriate relationship between
state and federal courts in an era in which these two court systems
usually share the last word on the meaning of federal law.

